Abstract:

In this paper, we have calculated the personal income tax for 2006 using 2004 figures updated for this year. Then, using the same data, we simulate the tax that would be obtained if we were to apply the rules in force in 2007. This allows us to compare the respective revenues, the inequality, progressivity and redistribution properties of the two taxes, as well as each of their individual aspects. We then measure the cost of the existence of the joint declaration derived from both sets of rules. For this we assume, in both years, that the joint tax return is eliminated. This shows the influence and weight of this type of return on the overall tax figures. Introduction The following is a small micro-simulation exercise. In it, we try to compare the tax in force in 2006 with that resulting from the 2007 reform. To do so, we will proceed as follows. The following section contains methodological aspects related to the estimation of personal income tax for 2006 and 2007, highlighting the assumptions made and the advantages and limitations of the database. The third section provides a detailed comparison of the results derived from the 2006 and 2007 taxes, both in terms of their components and their properties. The fourth section is devoted to testing the consequences of eliminating the joint tax return from these taxes. Finally, a series of personal reflections on the new tax are included as conclusions.

Reference:

Fuenmayor, A.; Granell, R. (2009): “La reforma del IRPF y la unidad familiar”, en Picos; F. y Díaz de Sarralde, S. (coord.): Las reformas fiscales bajo el microscopio. Microsimulación fiscal en España: datos, metodología y aplicaciones. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.